Lorenzo Pellegrini represents everything Roma’s youth academy should produce more often. Local boy, developed through the youth system, becomes first-team star and eventual captain. It’s the model every academy hopes to replicate.

Instead, Pellegrini is the exception. For every Pellegrini, there are dozens of promising Roma academy graduates who end up playing in Serie B, Serie C, or foreign leagues. Not because they lack talent — often they develop into solid professional players — but because Roma’s pathway from youth team to first team appears systematically broken.

The Primavera Problem

Roma’s Primavera (under-19) team regularly competes at high levels in youth competitions. They produce players who look promising at youth level. The problem appears at the transition point.

Most top clubs operate reserve teams or B teams that play in lower divisions of the professional pyramid. Barcelona B plays in Spain’s second division. Real Madrid Castilla competes in Segunda División. These teams provide a competitive environment where young players face professional opponents while remaining within the club structure.

Italy doesn’t allow this system. Serie B and Serie C clubs are independent entities. There’s no Roma B team playing professional football.

Instead, promising 19-year-olds face a choice: stay at Roma training with the first team but rarely playing, or go on loan to smaller clubs where playing time is available but development quality varies wildly.

The loan system can work — Pellegrini spent time at Sassuolo, which had an excellent development environment. But most loans send players to struggling Serie B sides focused on survival rather than development, or to mid-table Serie C teams with limited resources.

The First-Team Gap

The gap between Primavera and Roma’s first team is massive. Primavera players dominate youth opponents, then arrive in first-team training where the pace, physicality, and tactical complexity increase dramatically.

Very few 19-year-olds are ready for regular Serie A football. Those who are become immediate targets for wealthy clubs offering guaranteed playing time and higher wages. Those who aren’t ready but show promise get stuck in limbo — too good for Primavera, not ready for Roma’s first team, and sent on problematic loans.

Compare this to clubs like Ajax, where the reserve team (Jong Ajax) plays in the second tier. Promising players get several years of professional football at a competitive-but-manageable level before being evaluated for the first team. By the time Ajax promotes someone, they have 50-100 professional matches of experience.

Roma promotes players with limited professional experience directly into high-pressure Serie A environments. When they struggle, Roma often decides they “aren’t good enough” and sells them cheaply. Several have gone on to successful careers elsewhere after leaving Roma.

The Economic Incentive Problem

Roma’s financial situation creates perverse incentives around youth development.

Developing academy players for first-team use saves money on transfers. This should incentivize giving young players chances. But Roma operates under tight Financial Fair Play constraints and needs results to qualify for European competitions. Managers are evaluated on immediate results, not three-year development timelines.

When a manager decides between playing a 20-year-old academy prospect or signing a proven 27-year-old professional on loan, the immediate-results incentive points toward the experienced player. Even if the young player might become better long-term, managers don’t usually have long-term job security.

Roma also generates revenue by selling promising young players before they reach the first team. Since academy players have minimal book value, selling them for €5-10 million creates “pure profit” under FFP accounting. This can help balance the books in ways that selling established first-team players (who have high book values from transfer fees) doesn’t.

The result: Roma has financial incentive to develop players just good enough to sell to mid-tier clubs rather than good enough to play for Roma.

Tactical Complexity

Roma’s first team typically plays tactically sophisticated football with complex positional instructions and extensive preparation. This is standard for top-level Serie A clubs.

Primavera teams play simpler systems. Youth football emphasizes individual development over tactical sophistication. The tactical jump when players move up is substantial.

Few clubs have solved this perfectly, but some do better than others. Teams that maintain consistent tactical approaches across youth levels and first team make transitions easier. Roma has changed managers and systems repeatedly over recent years, making consistent development pathways nearly impossible.

The Mental Transition

Playing for Roma’s first team in Stadio Olimpico in front of 60,000 fans involves pressure that youth football doesn’t prepare players for. Make a mistake in Primavera and your coach might criticize you. Make a mistake for Roma’s first team and social media melts down, newspapers write articles about whether you’re good enough, and fans sometimes turn hostile.

Very few 19-year-olds handle this well. Those who do are unusual personalities. Most need gradual exposure — some pressure, but not the full intensity of Roma’s first team from day one.

The reserve team model provides this. Playing for Jong Ajax or Barcelona B involves professional pressure but not the intensity of Champions League football. Players develop psychological resilience gradually.

Roma throws young players into deep water and seems surprised when many drown.

What Would Need to Change

Fixing Roma’s youth development requires systematic changes that go beyond individual decisions.

Legal reform. Italy would need to allow Serie A clubs to operate reserve teams in lower divisions. This requires negotiating with lower-division clubs who understandably resist having their leagues filled with reserve teams. The political complexity is substantial.

Managerial incentives. Roma would need to evaluate managers partly on youth player development, not only immediate results. This requires accepting occasional short-term results sacrifices for long-term player development.

Loan system reform. Roma needs to be much more selective about loan destinations. Better to keep a player training with the first team than send them to a dysfunctional Serie B club. This requires careful scouting of potential loan clubs and ongoing monitoring.

Tactical consistency. Maintaining consistent playing philosophy across youth teams and first team would smooth transitions. This requires stability at the coaching level that Roma hasn’t typically demonstrated.

Psychological support. Providing sports psychology resources for young players making the professional transition would help. Few Italian clubs do this systematically.

Will It Happen?

Probably not soon. The problems are structural and require coordination across Italian football, not just Roma’s decisions.

Individual players will continue to break through occasionally, probably at a similar rate to currently. The Pellegrini path will remain exceptional rather than normal.

Most promising Roma academy players will continue to be sold to smaller clubs, where they’ll have solid careers while Roma continues to spend heavily on established players from other clubs.

From a pure results perspective, this might be rational. Developing players is uncertain and time-consuming. Buying proven professionals is more predictable.

But it seems like a waste. Roma has good youth infrastructure, talented young players come through the system, and then most disappear because the development pathway breaks down at the crucial transition point.

It’s not a problem unique to Roma — many big Italian clubs struggle with similar issues. But that doesn’t make it less frustrating.